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In this paper, I return to issues explored in Wright (2001) and (2004). The abstract for the 
latter begins with the sentences, 
The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐
inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐
empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea
consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of 
principles of basic logic. 
I would have done better to write that “the attraction of this idea depends on our overlooking . 
. .” In the discussion to follow, which is self-contained, I shall reprise and, I hope, improve on 
some of the considerations that motivate taking the possibility of this somewhat counter-
intuitive species of non-cognitivism seriously. I will conclude by reflecting briefly on its 
relationship to one of the central themes of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of logic, viz. the 
idea of logic as ‘antecedent to truth’ bruited in the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. 
I 
To fix ideas, we’ll focus primarily on the conditional, and specifically on propositions that, in 
one way or another, register the validity of modus ponens and conditional proof. Our concern 
here, accordingly, is with the knowledge that we—or most of those of us who understand them 
—think we have of the propositions expressed by claims such as these:1 
(i) If a conditional and its antecedent are both true, then so is its consequent
(ii) When it is true that if P is true, so is Q, then if P is true, so is Q
(iii) If Q can be shown to follow from P, then if P is true, so is Q
(iv) This inference pattern is valid:
{A1......An} |– A ;    {B1......Bn} |– if A, then B 
{A1.....An, B1....Bn} |– B 
(v) If Q is true on a certain set of assumptions, then if all but one are true, Q is true if the last is true.
(vi) This inference pattern is valid:
1 It won’t matter for present purposes that some philosophers have raised doubts about these particular principles — 
at least, it won’t matter unless you already think that no propositions of the kind illustrated below are ever known, 
whatever logical operation they may concern. Otherwise, if you are uncomfortable with the idea that the listed 
propositions are correct, switch to an example where you are more comfortable with the claim to know the 
propositions associated with it in the manner in which those listed are associated with the conditional. 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Wright, C. (2018), LOGICAL NON-COGNITIVISM. 
Philosophical Issues, 28: 425-450. doi:10.1111/phis.12132, which has been published in final form at 
https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12132. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With 
Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving. 
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{A1.....An} |– B 
{A1.....An-1} |–  if An, then B 
What is the relationship between propositional knowledge of this kind and knowledge of 
logic? They are certainly not the same. Any rational subject knows a lot of logic. But for those 
who have not taken courses in logic, or otherwise thought about it, this knowledge is for the 
most part practical knowledge. It is Rylean ‘knowledge how’.2 Any rational subject, 
notwithstanding that we are all prone to fallacies and mistakes in our reasoning, has a 
significant logical-inferential competence. It is a nice question whether this competence is 
something we are born with like, perhaps, a Chomskyan generative grammar, or whether it is 
bestowed as part of learning a first language, or whether, like simple arithmetic, it is taught to 
us in our very early years in language — though without, at least in any school of my 
acquaintance, explicit attention in the curriculum. But even if this last proposal is roughly 
correct, it is clear at any rate that logic is not, for most of us, learned by learning propositions 
like the above. Our inferential competence precedes the recognition of such propositions and 
may be well developed in subjects who are not good at recognising explicit statements of 
logical principles to which they themselves, for the most part, competently conform. 
Of what interest or importance, then, is our apparent basic logical propositional 
knowledge? It may be suggested that it is interest or importance enough, from the point of 
view of the enquiring epistemologist, simply that we seem to have it. For if we have such 
knowledge, then there must be something to be said about how we get it. And saying 
something illuminating about that is, familiarly, none too easy a thing to do. We will explore 
some of the salient difficulties below. But first we should note a special point about the 
potential significance of the phenomenon. This emerges if we ask: what is the relationship 
between our basic inferential competences and logic as an explicit scientific-theoretical 
subject?  
There is a possible, perfectly reputable scientific project which would consist in the 
attempt to codify and systematise our actual deductive inferential habits. This would be an 
empirical sociological project. It would stand comparison with empirical linguistics or the 
attempt to write up the rules of Chess, say, in a scenario where the game continued to be 
widely played in a community — perhaps among the descendants of a small number of 
survivors after a nuclear holocaust — but where no explicit statement of the rules and object of 
the game had survived. But to think of logical theory on that model ignores the point that 
logic, as usually conceived, is a normative science.3 Its project is not, or not merely, the 
2 I take no stand here on the question, revived by Stanley and Williamson [2001], whether knowledge-how is 
invariably sourced in propositional knowledge. 
3 In a famous passage in the Philosophical Investigations (§38), Wittgenstein reports Frank Ramsey as having 
emphasised this to him in conversation. He goes on to remark: “I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was 
doubtless closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we often compare the use of 
words with games and calculi which have fixed rules ... .” Well, there can only be conjecture what Ramsey may have 
had in mind but it seems not unlikely that Wittgenstein quite misunderstood him: that the remark was, rather, a 
reaction to the conception of logic enshrined in the Tractatus, according to which logic is “the scaffolding” of all 
possible thought — a network of platonic structural propositional relationships that hold quite independently of actual 
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systematic general description of actual inferential practices but the development of theory that 
is apt for the evaluation of those practices, a theory at least part of whose brief is to constrain 
our judgements about what follows from what, about which are good inferences and which are 
bad, and why. 
 That is a crucial difference with the example of empirical linguistics or post-nuclear 
chess. In the latter scenario, we can envisage some of the early attempts of the theorists 
coming in for criticism based on practitioners’ memories and a shared sense of what 
constitutes allowable play. But we cannot so readily envisage traffic in the other direction. If 
one of the theorists were to say, “I am not interested in your sense of how the Knight moves, 
even if a majority share it. The question that concerns me is: how ought it to move,” there 
would be a question about the intelligibility of the announced concern. This is not, of course, 
to say that there is no notion of correct chess practice that allows for a potential contrast with 
what practitioners may happen to agree is correct chess practice. The contrast kicks in if, for 
example, a copy of the rules is found and it turns out that common practice of the game now 
diverges from them in certain respects. (Perhaps castling has come to be generally permitted 
even after the King has previously been moved.) But this is not, save in the context of a certain 
social conservatism, a normative notion. If there is normativity involved, it is a normativity 
broadly comparable to that of rules of etiquette. “That’s not how it is done”. It is possible, but 
intellectually hugely unattractive, to take such a view of logic. The normativity of logic, we 
think, is an altogether more substantial matter, rather better compared with that of ethics, 
where the corresponding contrast evinced by, “ I know that this is what customarily passes for 
acceptable behaviour but is it how we ought to behave,” always has prima facie traction. 
 If that is right, then what provides for such traction in the case of logic? Clearly it would 
be silly to go after a theory that is to be potentially normative in this more exigent sense unless 
we are able to place controls on the acceptability of logical theory that draw on something 
other than our actual unreflective patterns of inferential behaviour. There has to be some 
criterion for the acceptability of the theory other than descriptive adequacy. And of course we 
think there is. We think we have more than our inferential dispositions to go on. We think we 
also have knowledgeable impressions of what constitutes a valid inference. We credit 
ourselves with some form of insight into what constitutes a valid inferential step or, at least in 
cases of sufficient simplicity, with the ability to recognise valid steps by something like ‘the 
light of reason’. It is because it is constructed so as to answer to this reflective sense of how 
we ought to reason, rudimentary though it may initially be, that logical theory is enabled to 
exert a normative influence over actual inferential practice.  
 Recognising this point is perfectly consistent with acknowledging an evolving, dynamic 
relationship between logic as the theory of valid inference and our reflective impressions of 
validity, a relationship in which each impacts on and may be modified by the other in a two-
way developmental synergy. (One will presumably want to say something similar about the 
relationship between ethical theory and the verdicts of untutored moral common sense or 
conscience.) The important point remains that the scope for a theory to be normative over a 
practice depends upon its being answerable to some available conception how that practice 
                                                                                                                                                          
human inferential practices, but of whose availability to our thought not a glimmering of an account is there ventured. 
Normativity requires that agents can be cognisant of the norms.  
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ought to be conducted which is not simply lifted descriptively from the patterns it actually 
exhibits. The normative interface needs to be provided by some kind of repertoire of 
judgements that are arrived at other than as anthropological generalisations about actual 
patterns of performance.  
 One importance of the basic, pre-theoretic propositional knowledge about valid 
inference with which most of us are inclined to credit ourselves is thus that, in this way, it 
anchors the aspiration of logical theory to the kind of normativity with which, traditionally, it 
is credited. In describing this knowledge as basic, however, I do not mean to prejudge its 
cognitive provenance. In particular, I do not mean to presuppose that our access to it is non-
inferential — though of course, considering only its characteristic phenomenology, it may 
sometimes impress that way.4 “Basic” is intended to caption, rather, what may be thought of as 
a kind of logical Euclideanism: the idea that the normative science of logic rests on the 
foundation of a range of what impress us as obvious, certain, apparently a priori truths of 




What, then, is to be said on the question of cognitive provenance? If we have knowledge of 
this kind, then, as remarked, there has to be something to be said about how it is accomplished. 
So we need to confront the question: is there any plausible epistemological model that explains 
how we might come to know propositions of the kind illustrated, and come to know them, 
moreover, in such a way that we might justifiably credit ourselves with this knowledge5 and 
thereby justifiably assign such propositions a foundational role in a normative science of 
logic? 
 As noted, it is often assumed that the propositions in question tend, characteristically, to 
impress us as immediately obvious. So it is no surprise that philosophers who have confronted 
our leading question have often made proposals invoking some faculty of a priori immediate 
‘intuition’ or of direct rational sensitivity to the logical relations that these propositions depict. 
Others, though, have regarded any such idea as ad hoc and wholly unexplanatory. We’ll have 
to come back to the matter. But first, are there any viable alternatives? 
 Well, broadly there can only be two. We can either attempt to make out that, contrary to 
appearances, our knowledge of such propositions, though a priori, is inferential after all; or we 
can attempt to make out that it is a posteriori knowledge, grounded in a manner essentially no 
different to that of our knowledge of propositions of empirical science. Both types of view 
have been represented by distinguished and influential adherents and it would be 
 
4 Actually, I’ll question this often claimed ‘phenomenology of immediacy’ below. What is not doubtful, though, is 
that the targeted propositions characteristically impress us as reflectively obvious. 
5 A distinction between having knowledge and being in position to credit oneself with it is imposed by any conception 
of knowledge that denies that knowing need be a luminous state. I am going to take it that a satisfying defence of 
cognitivism about basic logic requires more than that a model be provided of how some thinker, of such-and-such 
powers, might in principle come to know the kinds of proposition that concern us. What cognitivism should offer is an 
account of how we come by the knowledge that we think we actually have. A successful such account must vindicate 
our claim to basic logical propositional knowledge. This point will be important later. 
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presumptuous to suggest that decisive grounds for dismissing them might be marshalled in a 
single short paper. Let me nevertheless remind the reader of some causes for serious 
misgivings whether any approach of either of these two kinds can be ultimately satisfactory. 
 A view of the latter kind was of course famously championed in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”. The view there outlined by Quine represents, I think, the best available prospect 
for a thoroughgoing empiricist epistemology of logic. Its shortcomings are accordingly 
instructive and important. According to “Two Dogmas”, propositional knowledge of logic is, 
like all theoretical scientific knowledge, fundamentally empirical.  Propositions of the relevant 
kind, if known at all, are known by means in no way importantly different to the way in which 
any proposition of theoretical science is known. These propositions may indeed be central in 
the ‘web’ composed by the totality of our empirical beliefs, where centrality is a function of the 
depth of their entrenchment in our thinking. Still, they are not epistemologically special. The 
fundamental grounds for accepting them, like all propositions of theoretical science, are 
provided by the empirical successes of theory in which they play so central a role. 
 It is a limitation of any such empiricist account that it has no evident resources to explain 
the phenomenology of reflective obviousness characteristic of the propositions concerned. That 
we find such propositions obvious can, for the empiricist, at best be regarded as a kind of 
motivational prompt, of no particular evidential significance. Knowledge of such propositions, 
properly so regarded, will come on the scene only after the proven success of empirical theory 
in which the patterns of inference they codify are perceived to play an essential role. This is 
unsatisfying. It goes against the grain to suppose that someone who reflects on the pattern of 
inference by modus ponens for the first time and concludes that is obviously valid, has 
accomplished nothing relevant to the question whether they now know that it is valid. 
 A more fundamental objection, however, concerns whether a Quinean account of the 
epistemology of basic propositional logical knowledge is so much as coherent. Quine's idea, 
notoriously, is that in any situation of potential confirmation or disconfirmation of an empirical 
hypothesis, a holism is activated to the effect that not only that hypothesis but all other 
ingredients in play, including statements of the evidence, statements of initial conditions, 
predictions elicited from the hypothesis on the assumption of the initial conditions, and the 
underlying logic that mediates those predictions, are likewise in the firing line and may 
legitimately be taken as confirmed or disconfirmed. Initially, this is apt to seem incoherent on 
grounds that resonate with a point that Wittgenstein expressed figuratively in On Certainty, 
when he wrote that “If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put”.6 Dispensing with the 
figure, the point is that a proposition cannot both be up for test and part of the apparatus of 
testing. An optometrist can test whether my eyes are functioning well by having me try to read 
the letters on a chart. But she cannot simultaneously test the proposition that the chart 
configures such-and-such letters in such-and-such an array and whether my eyes are 
functioning well enough to read them. The idea Wittgenstein is gesturing at is that propositions 
of logic— more specifically, propositions about what follows from what— always play a role 
in the testing of empirical theory comparable to the role in eye-testing of propositions about the 




context in which a prediction that they sanction is up for test, and the idea that they might be 
empirically accredited or discredited by a long-running series of such tests, and so come to earn 
a place at the centre of the ‘web’, is accordingly not a runner. 
 Now, the Quinean has, of course, a well-known reply to this, well captured by Neurath’s 
image of boat-repair while at sea. Indeed, the example of eye-testing itself suggests it. For of 
course the proposition that the chart configures such-and-such letters in such-and-such an array 
can be independently empirically tested. It is just that it cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed 
by my responses in a context in which it is being relied on to test my vision. And so, likewise, 
for propositions concerning what follows from what. We have to acknowledge that they cannot 
be up for test in a context in which the consequences they ascribe to a hypothesis, and thereby 
that hypothesis itself, are being tested. Still, there is no reason why they cannot themselves be 
subject to test in a different context. Such a context will necessarily involve further 
propositions about logical consequence that feature as part of the testing apparatus and so will 
in turn not themselves be under test therein. But they too will be eligible for testing in yet other 
contexts . . . So, what’s the problem? 
 Well, if we pursue this reply a little, it transpires that it teeters into incoherence with the 
proposed empiricist epistemology. Let ϑ be a theory that is to be tested against experience and 
let L be a formalisation of its underlying logic. Testing ϑ will involve the derivation from it 
using just resources specified in L of conditional predictions telling us what observations we 
should expect relative to certain specified initial conditions. Let I → O be a particular such 
conditional prediction. A body of evidence, E, will then count as confirmatory if it provides, or 
appears to provide, grounds for accepting both I and O but recalcitrant — Quine’s favoured 
term — if it provides, or appears to provide, grounds for accepting I but rejecting O. But recall 
that according to the standpoint of Quine’s holistic empiricism, every element contributing to 
such a verdict of overall recalcitrance is potentially open to rational revision. The potential 
suspects therefore include not only 
 (i) the theory, ϑ, itself;  
 (ii) the logic L that mediates the derivation of the testing conditional, I—> O;  
 (iii) the claim that E does indeed corroborate both I and not-O and  
 (iv) the bona fides of the evidence E,  
but also  
 (v) the claim that the relevant testing conditional is indeed an L-consequence of ϑ.  
The crucial question concerns the epistemological status of potential suspect (v). Should there 
be any doubt about (v), then we do not yet have a situation where any modification of the 
theory, or of its underlying logic, or of any of the other components in the situation is called 
for, nor therefore is there so far any cause to make adjustments that might, all being well, lead 
to an overall strengthening of our belief system and a justified further entrenchment of core 
ingredients in it. Thus the very process of gradual improvement of a system of belief in 
response to the “promptings” of experience demands a relative epistemic security, in any 
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testing context, for the type of judgement that (v) typifies.7 Simply: before we can move to 
consider what improvements apparently recalcitrant data should occasion, we need to know 
that we are indeed in trouble— that the data, if accepted, are indeed recalcitrant for predictions 
which are indeed consequences, relative to the logic used, of certain of our theoretical beliefs. 
The reader will probably have anticipated the problem this simple point presents for the 
Quinean account: if the only way in which any judgement can acquire the status of knowledge 
is by increasingly entrenched participation in successful empirical theory, how can our 
judgement that (v) is true possibly have acquired that status? For (v) is — or so we may 
suppose— a new judgement which we have never made before, attributing a new prediction to 
the theory, ϑ. Of course (v) may be an instance of a general (meta-) logical judgement that we 
have already made. But in that case, that it is so will itself be a novel judgement if (v) has not 
previously been formulated. The point, in short, is that a fully self-conscious process of theory 
refinement and improvement must, on the Quinean model, commit the theorist to judgements 
about logical consequence whose epistemic good standing is presupposed if the process itself is 
to be in epistemic good standing but which cannot in general yet have acquired the only kind of 
epistemic good standing that Quine's empiricism recognises: viz. entrenchment in successful 
empirical theory.  
 When, as the Quinean insists, ϑ’s underlying logic, L, is treated as simultaneously 
participating in the confirmational/disconfirmational ‘swim’, as it were, the judgements we 
have focused on will be metalogical and relative: they will concern what follows from what in 
L, and they will typically be arrived at by reasoning about L. If they indeed are knowledgeable, 
it would seem that we must say that knowledge of them is achieved by such reasoning, and that 
it will therefore depend on our knowledge of the first principles that determine the metalogic in 
which the reasoning is given. But these principles will just be versions of the rules for the 
conditional, the universal quantifier, and so on, our knowledge of whose good standing is what 
we are at present challenged to vindicate and explain.  
 We should draw the conclusion that Quine’s sophisticated empiricism has nothing 




Let’s move on. To the suggestion that our basic logical propositional knowledge might be 
uniformly a priori but itself inferential, a common initial reaction is speedy dismissal. For 
inference, surely, is at best a means for the transmission of knowledge from premises to a 
conclusion. It cannot create knowledge where there was none before, any more than memory or 
testimony can. If an inference issues in a priori knowledge, it must have had a priori knowledge 
as input. So not all a priori knowledge can be inferential. 
 
7 As the reader will note, (v) is a metalogical statement about the proof-theoretic capacities of L. It could be accepted 
by someone who rejected L— and indeed would likely be so if in the recalcitrant context envisaged, suspicion fell on 
L—and, conversely, might be rejected as a misrepresentation of the consequence relation encoded in L.  
8 A related line of criticism of Quine was first presented in Wright (1986), and is further elaborated in Melis and 
Wright (forthcoming). Further discussion of the significance of the argument may be found in Heal (1989), 
McFetridge (1990) and Hale (1999). 
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 This common reaction is, of course, an oversight. What it overlooks is the possibility of 
knowledge-conferring inference which discharges its premises— exactly the kind of inference 
licensed by conditional proof and by reductio ad absurdum. If propositions serving to articulate 
in one way or another the validity of basic rules of inference could be demonstrated by 
reasoning in accordance with principles of this character, then maybe knowledge of such 
propositions could be accomplished in tandem, and hence might be a priori inferential after all. 
 This is a hope which an important body of work published by Paul Boghossian in the 
years shortly after the millennium was aimed at substantiating.9 To be sure, there seems no 
prospect of accomplishing demonstrations of all the propositions that intuitively fall within the 
scope of ‘basic logical propositional knowledge’ using only reductio ad absurdum and 
conditional proof. But the prospects dramatically improve if we allow ourselves the resource of 
rule-circular demonstrations: demonstrations that, in the course of proving a schema, or 
conditional statement, that encapsulates the transition licensed by a particular rule of inference, 
make use of that very rule of inference. Consider, for example, the following natural deduction: 
 1 (i) P     Assumption 
 2 (ii) If P, then Q    Assumption 
 1,2 (iii) Q     (i), (ii) modus ponens 
 1 (iv) If (if P, then Q), then Q   (ii), (iii) conditional proof 
  (v) If P, then if (if P, then Q), then Q (i), (iv) conditional proof  
Here we have used modus ponens, along with conditional proof, to establish at line (v) a 
conditional that encapsulates the kind of transition modus ponens itself licenses in a way that 
discharges all assumptions. Might reasoning somewhat of this character provide a model of the 
manner in which we characteristically actually, or at least might recognise that modus ponens is 
valid?10 
 It is not a good reason for rejecting this suggestion if, for many of us, propositional 
formulations of modus ponens present with a phenomenology of immediate obviousness. 
Perhaps it was not always so. Imagine you are trying to help a rather slow student in your Logic 
and Argument 101 class who has somehow got stuck on the rule. It is not implausible to 
suppose that, striving to trigger the needed insight, you might explain matters somewhat like 
this: 
“Look, remember how we explained the conditional. A conditional statement is true provided that 
if its antecedent is true, so is its consequent. Right? So suppose you’re given that a particular 
 
9 See especially Boghossian (2000), (2001) and (2003). In those papers, Boghossian works with a template for rule-
circular justification that differs from the above in proceeding from (undischarged) semantic premises. Boghossian 
himself has since moved away from any rule-circularity proposal and now favours an intuitional account.  
10 Michael Dummett (1973) is sometimes cited as having anticipated Boghossian in proposing that rule-circular 
reasoning might be admissible in this context. As I read Dummett, though, his suggestion is subtly different: namely, 
that rule-circular reasoning might be at the service of the project of explaining the validity of a particular principle of 
inference, where that contrasts with the project of providing a demonstration of its validity that can be rationally 
cogent for someone antecedently open-minded about it. What the constraints should be on a successful explanation of 
validity will naturally depend on what we consider ‘explanation’ here might amount to. But there is no evident reason 
why such an explanation might not be good and yet unappreciable by someone antecedently unappreciative of the 
principle of inference whose validity it explained. 
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statement is true, and that so is a conditional statement in which that statement features as the 
antecedent.  Then it follows that the consequent is true, no?  And that will hold no matter which 
statements you are concerned with. See?”   
It is not unthinkable that this might help. If it does, won’t your student have been led to 
acknowledge modus ponens by reasoning which actually involves an unreflective employment 
of that very rule? No doubt we are, most of us, tacit modus ponens reasoners from a very early 
stage in our lives. If we are, and such reasoning is valid, why should our explicit recognition of 
its validity not be accomplished by means involving an exercise of this tacit competence? 
 It is an intriguing idea, to which there are four principal objections. Two, I think, can be 
rebutted but the third seriously restricts its interest in the present context and the fourth, if 
sound, is lethal.  
 The first objection is that the kind of deductive routine illustrated can be replicated for 
rules of inference in general, whatever logical operator, λ, they involve. For an elimination 
rule, for instance, simply list as separate assumptions each of the premises required by the rule; 
then carry out a step of λ-elimination to arrive at its canonical conclusion; then apply 
appropriately many steps of conditional proof to generate, discharging all assumptions, a 
conditional representing the transition permitted by the rule in the manner that line (v) above 
represents the transition permitted by modus ponens. And the point applies, of course, to 
introduction rules as well. We can, for example, straightforwardly derive a conditional to 
represent the transition allowed by conjunction introduction like this: 
 1 (i) P     Assumption 
 2 (ii) Q     Assumption 
 1,2 (iii) P&Q     (i), (ii) & Intro. 
 1 (iv) If Q, then P&Q    (ii), (iii) conditional proof 
  (v) If P, then if Q, then P&Q  (i), (iv) conditional proof 
But now, once allowed the use of the rules governing a logical operator to underwrite their own 
validity in this kind of way, we can parody the process for e.g. Prior’s tonk. Thus we obtain: 
 1 (i) P     Assumption 
 1 (ii) P tonk Q    (i) Tonk-Intro. 
  (iii) If P, then P tonk Q   (i), (ii), conditional proof 
and 
 1 (i) P tonk Q    Assumption 
 1 (ii) Q     (ii) Tonk-Elim. 
  (iii) If P tonk Q, then Q   (i), (ii), conditional proof 
This latter pair of ‘demonstrations’ had better be no good (at least in any context where the 
conditional is taken to be transitive.) But then how are those illustrated for modus ponens and 
conjunction introduction any better? 
 Well, they are certainly better in one respect, namely that the rules they utilise actually 
are valid! If our question is: how might a rational thinker come to know a proposition or 
principle of a certain sort, it does seem reasonable to allow that the construction of a model 
route to such knowledge may incorporate soundly functioning faculties and sound methods in 
general. So it does not seem reasonable to disqualify rule-circular demonstration as knowledge-
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productive just on the grounds that it admits of pathological instances where the rules involved 
are invalid.  Such a local pathology is consistent with the existence of good cases where 
knowledge can indeed be produced. There is more to say, but I do not think the spectre of tonk 
defeats Boghossian’s former proposal. 
 The second objection, however, is that there are no such good cases, for the simple reason 
that rule-circular reasoning is indeed circular— that is, viciously epistemically circular or 
‘question begging’, as we say. How should we assess that charge? 
 There is an assumption under which the charge is certainly correct. I will call it, 
suggestively, 
Tortoise: Acquiring knowledge by a logical inference requires independent knowledge of the 
validity of the rules utilised by the inference in question. 
If Tortoise is accepted, then before a rule-circular piece of reasoning like the above can be 
regarded as productive of knowledge of the inferential principle which its conclusion 
schematises, the subject will have to know that the inference was made in accordance with 
valid rules; since one among those will be the very principle that the reasoning aims to prove, 
there will therefore indeed be an epistemic circularity that spoils its credentials as a 
demonstration.11 
 Tortoise, however, should certainly not be accepted as stated. It egregiously over-
intellectualises the requirements for inferential knowledge. Children, and others who have no 
explicit concepts of inference, validity and invalidity, may nevertheless advance their 
knowledge by reasoning. To require that, in order to do that, a subject must know that their 
reasoning implements valid rules is as impracticable and unwarranted as to require that, in 
order to gain perceptual knowledge, a subject must know about their perceptual systems and 
the conditions for their reliable operation and that they are so functioning on the occasion at 
hand.  
 If Tortoise is wrong, with what should it be replaced? In what epistemic relation should a 
thinker stand to a logical inference if she is to get knowledge of its conclusion by carrying it 
out? Consider the more moderate-seeming: 
 Tortoise-light: Acquiring knowledge by a logical inference requires independent knowledge of 
the validity of the particular inference made. 
Tortoise-light dispenses with any requirement on knowledge-productive inference that one 
know of the validity of any associated general rules in favour of a requirement merely that one 
 
11 The requirement imposed by the principle Tortoise is not exactly what Carroll’s mischievous Tortoise foists on 
Achilles in his famous Mind discussion note (1896). There, Achilles, standing on the brink of making what is in fact a 
perfectly valid inference from A to B, is seduced into accepting that before he can properly do so, he is required to 
make explicit a needed additional premise, namely that A entails B. And then, once he agrees on the need to register 
that as an additional premise, he has no means to resist the suggestion that a further additional premise is needed, 
namely that {A, and A entails B} entails B.  . . . The Tortoise is thus suggesting that Achilles’ original proposed 
inference is enthymematic. A proponent of Tortoise, by contrast, can allow that Achilles’ inference is valid and fully 
explicit as far as its needed premises are concerned. Her claim will be, rather, that Achilles cannot derive knowledge 
of its conclusion from the inference unless he knows that the rule(s) exemplified by the inference is (are) valid. The 
inference’s merely being valid is not enough. 
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recognise the validity of the particular inference concerned. This allows that a rule-circular 
inference can avoid being flatly epistemically circular: you don’t need to know the very thing 
you are trying to prove—that the pattern of inference in question is valid —in order to get 
knowledge of it via the inference, but only that a specific instance of that pattern is good. Still, 
how might you come by that knowledge? There will still be epistemic circularity involved in a 
rule-circular inference unless that piece of particular knowledge is somehow available other 
than on the basis of the knowledge that the inference in question instantiates a valid rule. But 
how could that be? Is not knowledge of logical validity always and essentially knowledge of 
the validity of a logical form? If so, then Tortoise-light no less than Tortoise will proscribe the 
possibility of knowledge-productive rule-circular inference.  
 Tortoise-light too, though, is arguably independently objectionable, and for the same 
reason.  It a still seems overly intellectualised as a requirement on knowledge-productive 
inference in general, effectively requiring that a thinker can acquire knowledge by an inference 
only in the presence of knowledge that she has inferred soundly. That still seems too 
demanding, just as the corresponding condition would be in the case of visual knowledge and 
the good functioning of one’s vision or knowledge of one's past and the good functioning of 
one’s memory. 
  It helps to clarify the dialectical situation here to notice that both Tortoise principles are, 
as my choice of names suggest, potentially regressive. For knowledge that a prospective 
inference is valid will not in general, one would suppose, be obtainable without supplementary 
inference: in order to know that my premises entail a certain conclusion, I will typically have to 
reason to a conclusion to the effect that they do and now, if one of the Tortoise principles is 
everywhere in force, this supplementary reasoning will be knowledge-productive only if it is 
known to be valid in turn . . . . The threatening regress may naturally be blocked, consistently 
with e.g. Tortoise-light, if we invoke the idea that some knowledge that particular inferences 
are valid can be non-inferential — can be delivered, perhaps by direct rational insight. But of 
course that move cannot be an option for a rule-circularity epistemology of basic logical 
propositional knowledge. On that view, such knowledge is everywhere a species of a priori 
inferential knowledge.12  
 It follows that a theorist who proposes that basic logical propositional knowledge may be 
acquired by and only by rule-circular inference must reject any Tortoise-type constraint. The 
theorist will have to hold that legitimate knowledge-productive inference can be, as Boghossian 
was formerly apt to express the matter, blind; that is, unmonitored by any kind of beliefs, 
however crudely conceived, concerning its own good-standing and process. 
 Is there any such legitimate notion of inference? The idea that a movement of thought can 
be blind in this sense and yet nevertheless rank as a proper inference raises some acutely 
difficult philosophical problems, foremost among which is the difficulty of explaining what in 
 
12 It is also worth noting that a threat of regress remains if the application even of non-inferential knowledge that a 
particular inference is valid to the actual drawing of the inference itself somehow involves an inference. But I will not 
pursue that here. The basic point remains that a general account of the circumstances under which a valid inference 
from known premises can be productive of knowledge of its conclusion must not impose conditions that require the 
subject to make a supplementary knowledge-productive inference. Otherwise we turn knowledge-productive inference 
into a ‘super-task.’ 
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such a case makes a movement of thought from A to B inferential at all, —what, if no 
monitoring by accompanying beliefs about validity, or “Therefore. . .”, or “So . . .”, is required, 
distinguishes inference, properly so regarded, from a case of mere “mental jogging”, as John 
Broome has expressed it,13 or mere association:  a mere thinking of A non-inferentially 
succeeded, for whatever cause, whether or not content-related, by a thinking of B. But I cannot 
pursue those issues here and propose simply to assume on behalf of the proponent of rule-
circular justification that the requisite notion can be satisfactorily made out.14 The refined 
version of the proposal we have to consider for present purposes is accordingly this: that basic 
propositional logical knowledge may (everywhere) be accomplished by valid but blind, rule-
circular inference.  
 It is this refined proposal that encounters the third and fourth of the objections I 
advertised above and this time, as I said, I think it must succumb.  
 The third objection concerns a limitation. Remember that our enquiry is proceeding from 
a reflective first-personal point of view. We are not merely asking for the outline of a route 
whereby basic propositional logical knowledge might be accomplished by some third party but 
for a plausible account of how we can have attained the basic propositional logical knowledge 
we take ourselves to have and rightly lay claim to it.15 This makes a crucial difference. The 
problem with blind reasoning is that the knowledge it generates — if any — will also be, in a 
corresponding sense, blind: unmonitored by reflective scrutiny. There is an analogue here with 
a point that is sometimes made in connection with pure reliabilism about knowledge. If the 
reliability of a process that generates a true belief is held to be what makes the belief 
knowledgeable, then in order for the subject justifiably to lay claim to that knowledge, she will 
need to be in position to vouch for the reliability of the process. Correspondingly, since our 
present project is to understand the basic propositional logical knowledge we take ourselves to 
have, we cannot rest content with a story that gives us only the mere possibility of blind 
knowledge of the validity of, say, modus ponens. We want so to understand the provenance of 
such knowledge as to be in position justifiably—indeed knowledgeably—to lay claim to it. 
But this—second-order — epistemic state is nothing that can be achieved by blind reasoning. 
Rather, attaining it will require, comparably, that we can vouch for the process that leads to the 
first-order knowledge. And that requires that we can vouch for the (rules of) inference 
involved. In brief: if a subject’s reasoning is not merely to generate knowledge but to put its 
agent into position reflectively to claim it, it cannot be blind. 
 
13 Broome (2014) 
14 The issues are further pursued in Boghossian (2014), Broome op. cit. n. 13 and Wright (20014a). Boghossian there 
and in other cent work has shifted towards a conception of inference that essentially involves the subject taking her 
premises to support her conclusion, though this ‘taking’ state is not required to surface as an explicit propositional 
attitude. My own inclination is to the view is that there is indeed basic blind inference, properly so described, and that 
it is to be understood as a kind of basic rational mental action for the reasons supplied by the explicit attitudinal states 
of the agent that encompass her premises — comparable to basic physical action for the reason of a belief and a 
desire, which is similarly blind; that is, requires no mediation by ‘taking’ ones belief and desire to rationalise one’s 
action. 
15 Cf. n. 5 above. 
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 There is a yet more fundamental difficulty — the fourth objection advertised. For even 
allowing that some knowledge-productive inference can be blind, it by no means follows that 
every type of inference that can be knowledge-productive can be performed blind. There is a 
special doubt about this in the present case. The inferences outlined above culminate in 
schematically general conclusions. Knowledgeably to reach those conclusions thus requires a 
capacity for schematically general thought: the reasoner has to convince herself that any 
instance of line (v) of the modus ponens proof, for example, is good, no matter what 
propositions are taken for ‘P’ and ‘Q’. That much conceptual sophistication is demanded 
simply by an understanding of what is purportedly proved. Yet it is doubtful that a rational 
agent of that degree of sophistication could arrive at the justified belief that line (v) is true — 
effectively a universally quantified belief — by blind reasoning in which no heed was paid to 
the question whether each of the steps leading to it would be good no matter what propositions 
were taken for ‘P’ and ‘Q’. But of course to pay heed to that question is in effect to consider 
whether the rules in accordance with which those steps are made are valid — and to raise that 
question is to cease to infer blind. 
 We can place this objection in what may be a helpful perspective if the reader will allow 
that the schematic generality of line (v) requires that the proof as displayed is, strictly but 
harmlessly, incomplete— that is, if it is acknowledged that, if (v) is to be understood as 
carrying the required generality, then our reasoner needs to understand what she has 
accomplished in such a way as to sustain the inference on to the explicitly universally 
quantified 
 (vi) (∀P, Q) (If P, then if (if P, then Q), then Q).  
For now the transition from (v) to (vi) is in effect, a universal generalisation step. But 
universal generalisation is not syntactically individuated. If all we know is that an agent has 
made the step from ‘Fa’ to ‘(∀x)Fx’, then, the inference could also be either of, e.g., a chancy 
single-case induction or an inference to a presumed best explanation. What will make it into a 
universal generalisation step, if it is one, is the agent’s taking it to be supported by collateral 
grounds that entitle her to treat ‘a’ as parametric, so that the soundness of the reasoning to 
‘Fa’ in no way depends on the choice of a referent for ‘a’. Since it is thus individuated in the 
reasoning agent by being based on considerations which are taken to implicate the thought, 
roughly, that anything (perhaps in a contextually relevant range) could here be taken for ‘a’ 
without compromise of the good standing of the reasoning, it follows that universal 
generalisation is a species of inference that constitutively cannot be made blindly, but must be 
monitored by a certain kind of reflection.16 The thought is then that the same is already true of 




So, we are driven back to the initial and, many will feel, the most natural-seeming proposal: 
that our propositional knowledge of basic logical relationships is, in at least some instances, 
 
16 Cf. Dogramaci (2010).  
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the product of a special capacity for rational insight, delivering non-inferential knowledge a 
priori. Proposals of this general kind — I’ll dub the genus the intuitional proposal —are quite 
widely supported in the literature, although there are, as one would expect, significant 
differences of detail among their proponents.17 Here, though, we can prescind from those 
differences. 
 Now, one should not expect to be able straightforwardly to refute a proposal of this 
character.18 There is a phenomenon of widespread non-collusive agreement about the validity 
of basic inferences, and the suggestion that this should be explained by postulating a special 
kind of cognitive sensitivity to the facts concerning which such inferences are valid is not 
going to be shown to be false unless further, no doubt controversial constraints are imposed on 
how it needs to be elaborated. Indeed, the proposal of a ‘direct sensitivity’ hypothesis will be 
an option in every area of our thought and talk which assumes, in Simon Blackburn’s nice 
phrase, a “propositional surface” and in which there is a sufficient measure of agreement to 
call for explanation. The direct sensitivity move is thus available for each of ethics, aesthetics, 
basic culinary taste and comedy. The question, accordingly, is not whether we can show that 
e.g. the ethical intuitionist is wrong but, rather, whether the intuitionist proposal provides the 
best explanation of the provenance of our ethical judgements; and there is, of course, a wide 
range of ethical theories that each deny that it does. To be sure, in the case of basic logic, the 
remaining available options— at least if the conclusions of the preceding discussion are 
accepted— are somewhat thin on the ground. In fact, there are essentially only two. These are, 
respectively, to continue to allow that our beliefs about basic logical truth and validity can, in 
the best case, be knowledgeable but to deny that, when they are, this knowledge is the product 
of any specific mode of cognitive achievement; and to deny that we actually have any such 
knowledge, properly so termed. Neither may seem terribly attractive.19 So what causes are 
there for discontent with the intuitional proposal? 
 Historically, a certain kind of naturalism has provided one such prominent cause. There 
seems to be simply no prospect of any kind of, by normal natural-scientific standards, 
adequate explanation of how a faculty of intuitional sensitivity to basic logical relationships is 
supposed to work. But why exactly do we need an explanation in the first place? Why should 
we not rest content with the idea that a certain judgmental capacity of ours is purely cognitive 
even though no account is in prospect of how it accomplishes what we take it to do? To what 
extent should the postulation of a cognitive capacity be hostage to the possibility of an account 
of how it works? 
 The question is given an edge by the refection that what is a stake here is presumably a 
sui generis capacity: a capacity to recognize, a priori and non-inferentially, necessary 
connections that are neither explicitly axiomatic nor definitional. Thus we cannot assume that 
an explanation of its workings should proceed by way of an assimilation, or subsumption of 
 
17 Thus compare  Bealer (1992 and 1998), BonJour (1998), and Sosa (1996 and 1998) with each other and with 
Bengson (2015). 
18 I here use “refute” with its traditional meaning, whereby to refute a proposition is to show it to be false, and not 
merely to deny it. 
19 We will consider one version of the former in the next section. 
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the capacities in question under something more familiar and better understood—as when the 
navigational abilities of honey bees are explained by the sensitivity of their visual systems to 
polarized light, or the computational abilities of mathematical prodigies are explained by the 
ascription to them of certain sub-personal recursive routines. The explanation of a sui generis 
capacity cannot be a special case of the explanation of anything else we do. But what other 
kind of account might reasonably be expected? The senses and memory provide examples of 
sui generis cognitive capacities whose workings are unmysterious enough to foreclose on any 
doubt about their bona fides.  But in those cases, the workings are of course causal. Nothing 
amounting to a causal sensitivity is to be expected in the basic logical case since the logical 
relationships putatively recognised are not, presumably, among the causal antecedents of 
anything all.  
 These considerations tend towards the thought that, if there were a capacity of non-
inferential yet productive recognition of truth/validity at work in our ratifications of 
propositions of basic logic, it might not have been be reasonable to expect any explanation of 
its working in the first place. But then, absent that, why believe in it? Even if not an 
explanation of its working, ought we not at least to demand some evidence that a genuinely 
cognitive sensitivity is at work?  
 The rationalist will likely respond that ample evidence for that is provided by the near 
universal agreement in judgement that these propositions generally provoke: all (normal) 
people, it will be alleged, agree about their cogency. But this is dialectically a very weak 
consideration, even if it is true. The sense of humour is sufficiently widely shared to make 
comedy a practicable profession, and it is readily conceivable that it might indeed be near 
enough universally shared, even though the kinds of psychological process involved in our 
comedic responses were no different to what they actually are. That would not be enough to 
transform the sense of humour—if it is not already so—into a genuinely cognitive capacity, a 
capacity to ‘track the comedic facts’.  By contrast, the (alleged) near universal agreement 
about the acceptability of the basic logical truths might wane: young children might 
increasingly not ‘get’ them, even though competent enough with simple reasoning routines. 
The ‘immediate obviousness’ of such propositions might increasingly elude us, rather as the 
ability to find one or the other aspect of the Necker Cube in the standard diagram sometimes 
goes missing for some people. If that happened, it would do nothing to suggest that the 
competence we actually have is not purely cognitive. 
 Bats have a sui generis capacity to track the positions and movement of objects in their 
vicinity by echolocation. But we know this only because we have independent knowledge of 
the things that bats are thereby sensitive to—so know that they are getting something right—
and have presumably been able to verify what kind of disruption to their abilities is involved if 
they are prevented from making the relevant noises and receiving echoes. Scientists have 
further been able to construct a physiologically attested account of how echolocational 
sensitivities are realised in bats’ sensory and neural systems, thereby providing a best 
explanation of how they are able to get the relevant matters right. With basic logical 
propositions, in contrast, we don’t so much as get to first base for a project of that kind. For we 
have no independent check on the matters with which, on the rationalist proposal, our 
impressions of logical truth put us in touch:  there is no independently certified body of such 
truths which our intuitive rational capacity could then be verified as enabling us to keep track 
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of. We have, as it were, only our own word for which the basic logical truths are, and can 
accordingly run no independent check on the efficacy of our apparently immediate responses 
to them. That particular form of scrutiny of the hypothesis of a sui generis cognitive capacity 
cannot apply in the present case.  
 To take stock. The force of the point against the intuitional proposal provided by the lack 
of any prospect of a scientific-naturalist account of the workings of the cognitive capacity it 
postulates is qualified by the case for saying that, on reflection, it is perhaps unreasonable to 
expect such an explanation. But any pro-intuitionalsignificance of this point is qualified in turn 
by the further consideration that nor do we have any independent evidence that the judgements 
we are focused upon are by and large aligned with the matters they concern. 
 The situation is dialectically thoroughly unsatisfactory. Can we improve it?  
Consider one of our post-nuclear chess players who has never explicitly encountered a 
formulation of the rule controlling the movement of the Bishop but has, as we say, picked it up 
by immersion in the practice of the game. Suppose that now, for the first time, they consider a 
formulation of the rule—say  
(B) From the square it occupies, a Bishop may move diagonally, backwards or forwards, through 
 any number of consecutively unoccupied squares, and may only so move. 
Their assent to this proposition is to be expected. Indeed they may find the so-formulated rule 
immediately and obviously correct. But what they assent to is a proposition whose normative 
force concerns acceptable practice—that this is one aspect of how the game is properly played. 
And the proposition that corresponds to practice in accordance with modus ponens in the way 
that B corresponds to performance in accordance with the Bishop's rule is, notably, not the 
proposition that modus ponens is valid but rather the proposition, roughly, that here is how to 
infer from a conditional premise, that this is one aspect of how acceptable conditional 
inference goes. Assent to that proposition, based on reflection on one's practice, is nothing to 
our purpose and nothing remarkable. It is a close relative of the general capacity we all have 
for knowing our own intentions. Knowing that this is correct play in the sense of: play in 
accordance with the rules we follow, is not, in the case of rules of inference, the same thing as 
knowing that how one plays is correct in a sense of ‘correct’ correlative to validity. In the case 
of the Bishop's rule, there is of course no further issue about correctness in any such further 
sense. But in the case of modus ponens, crucially, we think, pace Wittgenstein, that there is.  
 This point gives rise to a new challenge to an intuitional account of basic propositional 
logical knowledge: the challenge to justify the description of the process that leads to such an 
explicit acknowledgement of a (propositional schematisation of a) logical rule as implicating a 
recognition of validity rather than merely a becoming explicitly conscious of one aspect of 
one’s sense of acceptable inferential ‘play’. A solid motive needs to be provided for describing 
the matter in the former way if the intuitional proposal is to be vindicated. Can one be 
provided? 
 I foresee that this new objection may meet with some impatience. “Just look”, it may be 
said, “at the overt content of the propositions in question. They explicitly talk not about how 
things are done or about one’s sense of acceptable inferential practice but about truth, validity 
and entailment. Why is there suddenly an issue about their real purport? Why should we not 
just take their content at face-value?”  
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 Well, because so to do without further question is, naively, to assume that we can 
straightforwardly read metaphysical commitments off the surface of the way we are 
accustomed to express ourselves — as if the Humean idea that, in at least some areas of our 
thought and talk, our judgements  “gild and stain” rather than merely report, was hopeless 
from the get-go.  
 Readers will have to consult their own intellectual experience but, for myself, I have to 
report that I am moved by the following consideration. When I do focus explicitly on the overt 
content of one of the propositions in question, — acknowledging they don’t explicitly talk 
about what we find to be acceptable practice, or how we are generally accustomed to infer, but 
about truth, validity and what follows when what else is true,— when I do take this content at 
face-value and ask whether I undergo a ‘pure intellectual seeming’ that it is correct, the answer 
is simply, “No”. These judgements do not owe their appeal to pure ‘seemings-to-be-true’ —
pure presentations of how things (obviously) are— but to informal rule-circular reasoning. 
Consider, for instance, a propositional codification of reductio: 
 If a collection of premises have inconsistent consequences, and all but one of them are true, 
 then the last one must be untrue. 
Maybe that strikes you as just obvious, but it is surely very telling that we can perfectly 
properly and intelligibly ask you why — an inappropriate question in any case where an 
intuitional epistemology properly belongs —and you can sensibly answer, e.g: 
 Well, just think about it. The consequences of the envisaged premises are hypothesised to be 
 inconsistent. So they cannot all be true. But if all the premises were true, so would all their 
 consequences have to be. So if all but one are true, it has to be that the remaining one isn’t, 
 surely? 
No doubt variations are possible but some such routine, I surmise, is essentially what happens 
when we persuade ourselves on first encounter with an explicit formulation that reasoning by 
reductio is valid. Or consider a proposition schematising disjunction elimination, simplified 
for the case where there are no side premises: 
 If a disjunction is true, and its disjuncts have a consequence in common, that consequence  is 
 true.  
Again, a plausible account of the aetiology of conviction runs like this: 
 Suppose a given disjunction is true. In that case, at least one of its disjuncts will be true. 
 Whichever that may be, we know that any common consequence of them will have to be true, 
 since it will be true either way. So the hypothesised common consequence is true. 
I don't expect this suggestion to silence the friends of intuition (probably nothing will). But if 
correct, it does, in my estimation, present a very significant challenge. “Intuition” in this 
context is a philosophical term of art: a theoretical term that needs to be properly theoretically 
controlled if it is to subserve a debatable epistemological proposal. And we may take it for the 
purposes of the present context that, when the term is properly theoretically controlled, —
rather than used in the loose and popular sense in which all manner of judgements, from 
forebodings about the future to a detective’s suspicions of guilt, may count as ‘intuitive’, — it 
is intended to advert to a form of pure receptivity, a putative source of immediate knowledge 
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which, if we conceive it as evidence-based, is based just on the evidence of how things are 
presented to one.20 Intuitive knowledge had better be knowledge sourced in such a way that, as 
in the case (plausibly) of the deliverances of perception and episodic memory, any request of 
its author —“Why do you think so?”—for further supportive reasons for a claim based just on 
intuition betrays a misconception of her grounds. The proper reply to such a request should be 
“That is just how it strikes me”, as in “That is just what I (seem to) see”, or “That is just what I 
(seem to) remember”. So if the informal rule-circular accounts illustrated do indeed hit-off 
something of the essential aetiology of our judgements of the truth of basic logical 
propositions, that is exactly not the situation of those judgements. Rather, we base them on 
informal reasoning. And in that case, we should reject the intuitional proposal. Our judgements 
of the truth of basic logical propositions are not cases where conviction is fundamentally 
sourced in intuition.21  
 The rub, of course, is that if the negative findings of the previous section about the 
prospects for rule-circular justification are right, then the conclusion has to be that the most 
basic springs of our conviction of the truth of basic logical propositions are not a source of 
knowledge at all. If rule-circular reasoning is the root of these convictions, then the role it 




If basic logical propositional knowledge can satisfactorily be viewed as a product neither of 
empirical-scientific theorising, nor a priori reasoning, nor pure intuition, then we seem to have 
exhausted the possibilities for explaining it as any specific form of epistemic achievement, 
gained by dint of a specific kind of cognitive processing. That finding may seem to call into 
question its very status as knowledge — for with respect to anything we know, surely there 
must be an answer to the question: How do you know? By what means was this knowledge 
accomplished? But that might be resisted. Earlier we canvassed en passant the notion of 
knowledge based on no specific form of cognitive accomplishment. Might our mere 
acceptance of suitable basic logical propositions somehow count as knowledgeable without 
being rendered so by (their truthfulness and) any specific form of cognitive path leading to 
them? 
 There is one, historically hugely influential thought that says, “Yes”.  It is the 
inferentialist’s ur-idea that the basic logical propositions in question do no more than present 
stipulative implicit definitions of the logical operations they concern. Knowledge of a correct 
 
20 Bengson (2015) and Boghossian (forthcoming) are emphatic about this. 
21 I should perhaps stress that I am not, in drawing this conclusion, dismissing all prospect of a useful role in 
epistemology at large for some properly disciplined notion of intuition. But I would want to say something similar to 
the preceding about the much-touted intuitions that we are supposed to have about a large range of philosophical 
thought-experiments, including in particular Gettier cases. Someone of the opinion that Mr. Smith does not, in 
Gettier’s famous scenario, know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket can perfectly properly 
be asked, Why do you think so? And the appropriateness of the reply, “Well, because it is just a coincidence that he is 
right” shows that the source of the original claim is not a ‘pure-seeming’ but a discussible philosophical opinion to the 
effect that knowledge, properly so regarded, should preclude a certain kind of luck. 
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such definition, surely, may rest on no substantive cognitive accomplishment yet deserve the 
title of ‘knowledge’ nonetheless? 
 Well, perhaps. And we can grant that the propositions of the kind we are concerned with 
could be stipulatively laid down as purported constitutive principles for the principal operators 
they involve. Even when that is granted, there is till a great deal to say— and to worry—about 
how the effect of such stipulations might somehow be to underwrite knowledge of the 
propositions concerned ‘for cheap’.22 No matter. There is in any case a stark and fundamental 
difficulty with the implicit-definitional proposal when it is applied to the case of basic logical 
propositional knowledge. It is that the propositions that concern us simply are not, as a matter 
of sociological fact, stipulated as definitional of the logical operators they concern but come to 
our attention only after inferential practices in which those operators feature are already up 
and running. There is therefore no room in the first place for the idea that our acceptance of 
these propositions is concept-constitutive, ergo knowledgeable, in the fashion the implicit 
definition model requires. A plausible inferentialist account of our understanding of the logical 
operators will do better to regard the practices as definitive of the operators concerned. But 
then the problem becomes: by what epistemic route are we led to recognition of the truth of the 
relevant propositions. There just is no fast, or even obvious, track from the notion — even if it 
is granted —that our basic inferential practices are meaning-determinative to an explanation of 
how and why our acceptances of the relevant propositions can constitute the objective 




Is non-cognitivism about basic logical propositions anything we can live with? In part I of the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein writes that 
. . .the reason why [the steps in a logical inference] are not brought into question is not 
that they 'certainly correspond to the truth' -- or something of the sort, -- no, it is just this 
that is called 'thinking', 'speaking', 'inferring', 'arguing'. There is not any question at all 
here of some correspondence between what is said and reality; rather is logic antecedent 
to any such correspondence; in the same sense, that is, as that in which the establishment 
of a method of measurement is antecedent to the correctness or incorrectness of a 
statement of length.”23  
The interpretation of Wittgenstein's experimental jottings in his journals— for remember that 
the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is nothing other than a posthumous anthology 
of such—is, as we know, a fraught enterprise. Nevertheless we can discern in the above and 
surrounding passages two core claims: 
On the a priority of logic: the claim that our judgements of logical relationship, both of 
basic principle and on-going, belong to the apparatus of enquiry rather than composing a 
separate topic of enquiry— they need to be stable, shared and dependable if there is to be 
 
22 The issues here are explored in detail in Hale and Wright (2000). 
23 Wittgenstein Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, I, §156. 
 
 20 
such a thing as empirical enquiry, just as a unit of length needs to be agreed and stable if 
there is to be such a thing as determination of length. In this attenuated sense, they are 
indeed a priori. But that is less than saying that they are known a priori to be correct. 
On the correct understanding of the notion of validity: that it is not the responsibility of 
logic to correctly reflect internal relationships among propositions of truth-dependency, 
incompatibility, etc., which are fixed independently of our logical practices. Which 
propositions are true is not settled, from a metaphysical perspective, in advance of their 
integration into a system of inference. 
These proposals constitute a most thoroughgoing pragmatism about the relationship between 
our thought and the world. They renounce all vestige of the Tractarian picture of a fixed 
totality of worldly facts and a stable repertoire of representational contents objectively fit for 
their capture. The motivation for this pragmatism is a topic for another occasion but it is clear 
at least that the logical non-cognitivism we have scouted is a natural partner, indeed a 
requirement of it. What is worth stressing is that the converse is not true. Non-cognitivism 
about a region of thought is consistent with factualism. In particular, it is consistent with a 
robust realism about logic — with the idea that internal truth-conditional interrelationships 
among propositions are indeed fixed ‘in advance’, so that it is a constraint on logic to codify 
them correctly, and our responsibility to try to ensure that it does.  
 To be sure, non-cognitivism allied with factualism presents as a tragic combination, 
threatening that we cannot ultimately meet what we would otherwise judge as an absolutely 
fundamental epistemic responsibility. For what epistemic status, in that case, should be 
assigned to our basic logical propositional beliefs? How can they be better than mere congenial 
guesses? 
 On Wittgenstein’s view of logic, of course, there is no such tragedy. But I would suggest 
that there is none in any case. In previous work24 I have explored the notion of a kind of non-
evidential epistemic entitlement: a type of belief25 which we cannot avoid in reflective enquiry, 
which — in the best case —there is no reason to doubt, but which enquiry cannot be made to 
engage and corroborate satisfactorily, which “lie apart from the road travelled by enquiry”.26 
If, as I have argued, such beliefs may be regarded as epistemically rational, then non-
cognitivism need not threaten the rationality of our beliefs about basic logic, even when the 
“antecedence” doctrine is rejected in favour of what may impress as common-sense realism.27 
New York University and the University of Stirling 
 
24 Wright (2004), (2004a) and (2014) 
25 I here take no stand on whether ‘belief’ is the proper term for such acceptances. The matter is discussed in Wright 
(2004a). 
26 On Certainty 88. 
27 This paper has benefited from discussions at my graduate seminar on Inference at NYU, co-taught with Paul 
Boghossian, and at a Knowledge Beyond Natural Science project seminar at Stirling, both in April 2018. Thanks 
especially to Peter Sullivan for detailed written critical comments, and to Paul Boghossian with whom I have been 
discussing these matters for over 20 years. The research for it was largely conducted under the aegis of Stirling’s 
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